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This paper is intended to provide a critical overview of experimental and clinical research
documenting problems in figurative language processing in atypical populations with
a focus on the Autistic Spectrum. Research in the comprehension and processing of
figurative language in autism invariably documents problems in this area. The greater
paradox is that even at the higher end of the spectrum or in the cases of linguistically
talented individuals with Asperger syndrome, where structural language competence
is intact, problems with extended language persist. If we assume that figurative and
extended uses of language essentially depend on the perception and processing of
more concrete core concepts and phenomena, the commonly observed failure in atypical
populations to understand figurative language remains a puzzle. Various accounts have
been offered to explain this issue, ranging from linking potential failure directly to overall
structural language competence (Norbury, 2005; Brock et al., 2008) to right-hemispheric
involvement (Gold and Faust, 2010). We argue that the dissociation between structural
language and figurative language competence in autism should be sought in more general
cognitive mechanisms and traits in the autistic phenotype (e.g., in terms of weak central
coherence, Vulchanova et al., 2012b), as well as failure at on-line semantic integration with
increased complexity and diversity of the stimuli (Coulson and Van Petten, 2002). This
perspective is even more compelling in light of similar problems in a number of conditions,
including both acquired (e.g., Aphasia) and developmental disorders (Williams Syndrome).
This dissociation argues against a simple continuity view of language interpretation.
Keywords: figurative language, autism spectrum disorders, metaphors, idioms, impaired processing mechanisms
INTRODUCTION
Figurative language is a cover term for linguistic expressions
whose interpretation is nonliteral, where the meaning of the
expression as a whole cannot be computed directly from the
meaning of its constituents. Figurative language can vary in types,
degrees of extension from the literal and degrees of transparency,
and structure. Moreover, figurative expressions can fluctuate
from a single word to a long sentence. Here belong a range of
phenomena, such as metaphors, idioms, proverbs, humor and
jokes, hyperbole, indirect requests, clichés (Gibbs, 1999). Such
expressions are characterized by interpretations which cannot be
retrieved by simply knowing the basic senses of the constituent
lexical items, and where the addressee needs to arrive at the
intended meaning rather than what is being said literally.
It has been claimed that it is exactly the need to go beyond the
literal interpretation and grasp the intended meaning that makes
figurative language special and more demanding for processing
(Levorato and Cacciari, 2002). Unlike literal language, such
expressions depend more heavily on both linguistic and visual
context, and are often—in fact, impossible—to understand in
the absence of such context. Still, in everyday communication
much of the meaning is implied, and can be understood
following linguistic and contextual cues (Coulson, 2005). It is
this context sensitivity of natural language that has inspired
the continuity claim that figurative language is not exceptional.
From this perspective, all language and all its sentences are
multiply ambiguous whereby the content of all utterances largely
underdetermines their interpretation (Gibbs, 1994; Sperber and
Wilson, 2006). This approach suggests that figurative language
is rather to be found on a continuum from literal-to loose-
to metaphorical language and should not be considered as
a departure from normal language use. While this is one of
the more radical interpretations, all approaches arguing for
a lack of exceptionality in figurative language sustain that it
is pervasive both in language and in thought (Fauconnier,
1997, 2007; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987; Turner,
1991). If this is true, then it is not a special form of
language.
Yet, research in developmental disorders documents subtle
dissociations between the ability to understand literal expressions
and the comprehension of nonliteral (figurative) language. For
instance, high-functioning individuals with autism with intact
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 24 | 1
Vulchanova et al. Figurative language in atypical populations
structural language skills often fail to understand the meaning
of jokes, irony, and idiomatic language (Gold and Faust, 2010;
Vulchanova et al., 2012a,b). Thus, they present a case against a
simple continuum view of figurative language.
In this paper we present evidence from studies of figurative
language processing in autism arguing that this evidence calls
for a revision of a simple continuum view. We first review
issues of relevance to our main topic, such as how to best
approach and understand the similarities and differences in the
processing of literal and figurative language. For this purpose
we start by discussing evidence from typically developing
children and adults, to then move on to comment on the
data that can be found in looking at a population of special
interest to figurative language, namely individuals with autism.
We conclude by suggesting possible ways in which these
data can be interpreted in the light of current cognitive
accounts of autism and more broader approaches to language
comprehension.
FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE IN TYPICAL POPULATIONS
FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE ACQUISITION IN TYPICAL DEVELOPMENT
Language development provides evidence of the somewhat
different status of figurative language. It takes more time
for children to begin to appreciate extended uses. According
to Nippold (2006), the development of skills in processing
metaphors, idioms and proverbs is an important part of semantic
development. Compared to vocabulary acquisition and basic
semantic skills, skills in the domain of figurative language emerge
later. Thus, recent research (Levorato and Cacciari, 1995; Nippold,
1998, 2006; Kempler et al., 1999; Nippold and Duthie, 2003; Cain
et al., 2009) suggests that the acquisition of idioms takes longer
than vocabulary acquisition, and that it gradually takes off after
age five and on.
Opinions, and findings, however, divide concerning the path
of this development. Nippold (1998, 2006) and Nippold and
Duthie (2003) assume that this is a gradual development, not
essentially different from other lexical development, and that
it continues also in adulthood. However, Kempler et al. (1999)
show that the understanding of idioms follows a non-linear path,
very similar to the vocabulary burst between the second and the
third year (Marchman and Bates, 1994; Bates and Goodman,
1997). Unlike vocabulary, however, with idioms, this process takes
approximately four times longer, with a peak at around 11 years
(Vulchanova et al., 2011). In a study of 6- and 9-year-old children
and adults, Laval and Bernicot (2002) provide evidence that only
at age 9 can children start to appreciate and use context in idiom
comprehension. Furthermore, only from this age on children
show sensitivity to frequency and familiarity.
The appreciation of figurative language in development
requires coordination between cognitive, linguistic and pragmatic
skills (Tolchinsky, 2004; Bernicot et al., 2007). Several factors
play a role in the acquisition and comprehension of figurative
language. Among the most salient ones for idioms, for instance,
are frequency of the expression, transparency of its structure,
the context in which it is encountered, and linguistic skills
and competences (Nippold and Duthie, 2003). It is commonly
agreed and has been demonstrated that metalinguistic awareness
facilitates the understanding of figurative language, including
idioms (Levorato and Cacciari, 2002; Nippold and Duthie,
2003; Nippold, 2006). It has also been shown that reading
comprehension is a strong predictor of idiom comprehension
(Levorato et al., 2004).
Bernicot et al. (2007) investigated the order of acquisition of
different types of nonliteral language in children. They studied
the relationship between the children’s understanding and their
meta-pragmatic competence, defined as the ability to distinguish
between what is being said and what is meant in indirect language.
In that study they looked at three different types of expressions:
indirect requests, idioms and conversational implicatures, in a
story completion task. Their results demonstrate that mastering
advanced language skills and competencies, such as those required
for figurative language processing, correlates with age. This
may be attributed to the maturity needed for the processing
of expressions offering increased complexity of the inference
between the literal meaning (what we say) and the figurative one
(what we mean).
ACCOUNTS OF FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE PROCESSING
Metaphors and literal language
Metaphors are by far the most “popular” paradigmatic example of
figurative language. At the level of thought, conceptual metaphor
is a cognitive process by which we represent an abstract concept
in terms of a more concrete and tangible one. Metaphors establish
(novel) links or mappings between mental domains or spaces,
typically a source one and a target one (Fauconnier, 1985). As
such, they are ways of thinking capturing generalizations about
the world around us and our experience of it.
Theories of metaphors differ in how they assume metaphors
are processed, and whether they consider them a departure
from normal (literal) language or not. The standard pragmatic
view assumes that metaphors are expressions processed via
mechanisms different from those used for literal meanings. On
this view, the literal meaning should be accessed and rejected
before arriving at the intended (figurative) meaning. This implies
that an inference is necessary to access the appropriate intended
meaning (Grice, 1975). Many authors consider metaphors as
“special” structures which are present in everyday language and
change depending on time and culture (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980;
Turner, 1991).
Alternatively it is suggested that metaphorical and literal
meanings are processed in parallel and also use the same
mechanisms (Gibbs, 1994). Thus, for both lexical items and
metaphorical language, processing interacts with information
retrieved from the context (Gibbs, 1987, 1994). Gibbs et al.
(1997) found that metaphors did not require more time to
process than literal expressions. Furthermore, reaction times
did not differ when the context was adequate. An important
caveat here is, that equivalent processing times need not reflect
equivalent effort (Coulson and Van Petten, 2002; Bambini and
Resta, 2012).
Coulson and Van Petten (2002) point to evidence from
processing studies suggesting that metaphoric language places
heavier demands on processing and requires additional effort
for alignment and inference than literal language, not in
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the least by placing additional demands on working memory
(Blasko, 1999). They further argue that the continuity claim
should be distinguished from the equivalence claim, which
assumes that metaphoric language is no more difficult to
comprehend than literal language. They adopt a conceptual
blending approach to metaphor (Fauconnier and Turner, 1998),
which explains metaphor comprehension as a dynamic process,
which creates a blending space combining attributes from the
source and target domains. Thus, interpretation arises as a
result of selecting relevant properties of these domains and
inhibiting aspects which are not relevant through a process
of constant updating. In an ERP study, which tested three
types of expressions, sentences that ended with words used
literally, metaphorically and in an intermediate literal mapping
condition, they document that metaphors elicit the greatest
N400 effect, while literal mappings occupy a place between true
metaphors and literal statements judging by brain responses.
This study thus provides evidence for the continuity claim,
and, at the same time, shows that metaphors are indeed
more demanding for processing, but in a gradient way. The
authors suggest that metaphor “taxes” the system we use to
understand figurative meaning for two basic reasons. On the one
hand, one needs to establish a mapping between elements in
distantly related domains (e.g., unlike metonymy), and on the
other, to retrieve information from memory to integrate these
elements. Other studies have shown similar results (Pynte et al.,
1996).
A common problem in assessing results from research in
figurative language processing, as observed in Pickering and
Frisson (2001), is that word frequency, plausibility, and cloze
probability have not always been controlled in several studies
reporting reading times for literal and figurative language. Such
variables should be taken into account and would have produced
different results when determining whether figurative language is
more demanding compared to literal language.
Links between metaphors and other types of figurative
expressions have been suggested. Gibbs (2003) argues that
idioms, often considered as “dead” metaphors, in fact, offer
a more dynamic metaphor-based processing. In another study,
Gibbs et al. (1997) conducted a series of experiments using
a priming method to investigate the role of conceptual
metaphors in immediate idiom integration. The aim of the
study was to establish whether conceptual metaphors were
accessed faster in the context of idioms in discourse. Participants
accessed conceptual metaphors more often for the purpose of
understanding an idiom, and less so when they were processing
literal expressions or literal paraphrases of idioms. Furthermore,
this study demonstrated that people access the appropriate
conceptual metaphor when they are integrating each specific
idiom, and not a similar one with the same figurative meaning.
This suggests that idioms with the same figurative meanings may
be associated with different conceptual metaphors.
Processing of idiomatic expressions
As a form of nonliteral language, idioms have attracted
attention both in theoretical linguistics and in empirical
psycholinguistic research, as a result of their specific nature,
both in terms of structure and organization. Unlike regular
phrases and expressions, idioms come largely in a “pre-
packaged” form, with many, if not all of their components
which cannot be freely replaced or supplemented. Idioms are
expressions of varying degree of frozenness and semantic
transparency. On the one hand, they are retrieved from
the lexicon because they have to be acquired and stored
like lexical items, and, on the other, they are processed
like structures generated by grammar (Jackendoff, 2002;
Vulchanova et al., 2011). Due to this “double” nature or
different levels of processing, understanding idioms may pose
problems.
There are two kinds of theories regarding how idioms
are processed and understood. According to the Lexical
Representation hypothesis, idioms are stored as lexical items, and
understanding an idiom involves two parallel processes, a retrieval
process (which is faster), and a literal compositional computation
process based on decomposing every element separately (Swinney
and Cutler, 1979).
Hamblin and Gibbs (1999) highlight idiom decomposability
and suggest that idiom interpretation depends on identifying the
individual constituents, because most idioms are decomposable.
It is thus suggested that the processing and understanding idioms
cannot be reduced to lexical access or lexical retrieval only
(Cacciari and Tabossi, 1988; Gibbs, 1992; Vega-Moreno, 2001).
This type of approach bridges over to the second type of approach,
the configuration hypothesis. Authors that support it assume that
idioms are represented in a distributed way and they are processed
as complex expressions (Cacciari and Tabossi, 1988). Tabossi
et al. (2005) found that spoken idiom identification differs from
word recognition. This means that the modality of presenting
the idiom may affect the way we process these expressions as
well.
A central question in all of the above approaches to
idiom processing, but also more broadly to figurative language
processing, is whether literal meanings are accessed first,
and whether at all. Some authors reject the existence of
literal or default meanings altogether (Sperber and Wilson,
2006), while others suggest a revision of the concept of
literal meaning (Ariel, 2002). Recent experimental research,
however, provides evidence of the existence of literal meaning,
and support for a possible distinction between basic/literal
senses and interpretations, and extended/derived ones. Foraker
and Murphy (2012) investigated how polysemous senses are
processed during sentence comprehension. In this study, in
a condition where the context was neutral and did not
bias towards a specific sense, participants read disambiguating
sentences faster when these sentences were compatible with
the dominant sense of target words. Rubio Fernandez (2007)
provides further evidence of the “lingering” presence of literal
meaning in the processing of figurative language in the
domain of metaphors, where core features of word meaning
remained activated even after the metaphorical meaning was
retrieved.
Idioms are easier to understand in the presence of supportive
context. It has been commonly established that the main role of
context is to provide semantic support for decoding the target
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(appropriate) meaning of a sentence or an expression (Cacciari
and Levorato, 1989; Gibbs, 1991; Levorato and Cacciari, 1995;
Vega-Moreno, 2001; Laval, 2003).
Several factors influence idiom comprehension. Idiomatic
expressions can vary in transparency. It is much easier to
understand more transparent expressions that opaque ones.
Another factor is familiarity. It is a variable that influences
comprehension, and many studies establish that a higher degree
of familiarity increases performance, leading to better results
in different comprehension tasks (Gibbs, 1991; Levorato and
Cacciari, 1995; Nippold and Taylor, 2002; Lacroix et al., 2010).
We suggest here that competence in figurative language is
characterized by the ability to process language beyond the literal
interpretation of individual words. This competency relies both
on inferencing skills and on the ability to integrate contextual
information from both verbal and nonverbal sources. We expand
this idea further in the next sections.
While much of extended language use goes unnoticed to
typical native speakers of a language, and, as such may appear
part of normal communication, it may pose severe problems
for children and adults with developmental deficits. Such
populations offer a glimpse into subtle dissociations between
literal and nonliteral (figurative) language. For instance, in
the autistic spectrum, even high-functioning individuals are
often described as overly literal and often fail to appreciate
figurative expressions. Such dissociations speak against the
view that there exist no basic senses of lexical items (Sperber
and Wilson, 2006), since these senses appear to be the only
ones available to these individuals. This if often displayed in
problems in the autistic spectrum with resolving linguistic
ambiguity. We devote the rest of this paper to analyzing
this issue and reviewing what data from individuals with
autism can tell us about the true nature of figurative
language.
FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE IN AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a disorder characterized
by impairments in social interaction and communication, and
restricted behavior and interests. The impairment in social
interaction can be manifested in marked deficiencies in the
use of eye contact, reading facial expressions, emotions, body
posture, and gestures. Failure to develop peer relationships,
lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or
achievements with other people and lack of social or emotional
reciprocity, are also typical in autism.
Regarding the impairments in communication, the most
common problem, even in individuals with adequate structural
language, is the inability to initiate or sustain a conversation with
others, including inability to maintain a topic shared with the
interlocutor. In addition, ASD individuals frequently have a very
stereotyped and repetitive use of language, thus leaving no room
for spontaneity.
Individuals with ASD also show other restricted repetitive
and stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests and activities.
They may present encompassing preoccupation with one or more
restricted patterns of interest. They are often characterized by lack
of flexibility and adherence to specific, nonfunctional routines or
rituals, repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g., hand or finger flapping
or twisting, or complex whole-body movements). Often they
display persistent preoccupation with parts of objects (e.g., wheels
of a toy car).
POOR FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE IN ASD
In typical language development, the acquisition of metalinguistic
skills and the comprehension of figurative language seem to be
achieved in childhood by the age of nine or ten years according to
several authors. However, in ASD this process is typically delayed
and depends on various factors, such as degree of language
impairment, chronological age, context or social environment.
Findings in research suggest that there is a delayed rate of
development with regard to processing of ambiguity, idioms,
metaphors and other types of figurative language in individuals
with autism, and problems at more global levels of language
structure, although performance may improve with age (Melogno
et al., 2012a,b; Vulchanova et al., 2012a,b).
ASD is a disorder that significantly affects language and
communication, and many individuals with ASD do not develop
fluent language due to comorbidity with other impairments,
such as intellectual disability or language disorder (LD). When
LD is comorbid with autism, there are serious difficulties in
understanding ambiguous linguistic information, as would be
expected. In contrast, individuals with high-functioning autism
are distinguished by relative preservation of linguistic and
cognitive skills. They usually display a level of intelligence which is
normal or even above average, and quite often have specific talents
in certain areas. However, problems with pragmatic language
skills have also been reported in their case, even with clear
strengths in areas of grammar (Landa, 2000; Volden et al., 2009;
Vulchanova et al., 2012a,b). Such dissociations in ASD between
literal and figurative language argue against a simple continuity
model.
One of the first studies to address figurative language
comprehension and its roots in autism was the study by
Happé (1995). It compared three groups of children with
autism to a group of age- and VIQ-matched controls on the
understanding of three types of expressions, synonyms, similes,
and metaphors. In order to test the hypothesis that metaphor
comprehension correlates with the ability to read minds and co-
locutors’ intentions, participants were tested on both first-order,
and second-order Theory-of-Mind (ToM) tasks. This study was
inspired by ideas from Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson,
1986) and the aim was to put the basic assumptions of this
account to the test, by investigating its predictions on the well-
known problems in aspects of pragmatic language in autism.
The basic idea with the language stimuli used in the study,
administered as a sentence completion task, was that there is a
gradation of difficulty in processing language, ranging from full
transparency in literal expressions to close to full transparency
(similes), to nontransparency (metaphors). The findings from
this study confirm that metaphor comprehension is impaired in
children and adolescents with autism, against adequate processing
of similes, and that the ability to process metaphors is directly
linked to ToM ability. Thus, the ASD participants who passed
both first- and second-order ToM tasks outperformed both
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participants who solved only the first-order tasks and those who
did not pass either task.
The ToM account of the well-attested problems in autism with
metaphor comprehension was tested further by Norbury (2005).
In her study, an alternative hypothesis was put forth, namely
that language competence is a better predictor of performance
on metaphor tasks. For this purpose Norbury tested ASD
children first grouped according to language ability and autistic
symptomatology, and in a second analysis on their ToM ability.
Both types of groups were compared to typically developing
age-matched peers. The study included a number of tasks to
establish language status: the British Picture Vocabulary scales
(BPVS; Dunn et al., 1997), the Concepts and Directions subtest
of CELF-III (Semel et al., 2000), and the Recalling sentences
subtest of CELF-III. Semantic knowledge was tested on the Test
of Word Knowledge (ToWK; Wiig and Secord, 1992), which
includes synonyms, figurative language interpretation (idiomatic
phrases), word definitions and word ambiguity (polysemy)
testing. The results of this study demonstrate that semantic
ability, which is a core language skill, is a better predictor
of metaphor comprehension, whereas ToM, even though it
predicts a proportion of the variance, is a weaker predictor of
figurative language processing. Thus, only the children with a
language impairment, with and without autism, showed impaired
metaphor understanding. Furthermore, first-order ToM skills,
while probably necessary, are not sufficient to ensure success
with figurative language interpretation. These results, however,
should be interpreted with caution, since the test used to assess
semantic knowledge (ToWK) includes a number of subtests
assessing figurative language comprehension, and as such, should,
by definition, predict performance on metaphorical expressions
(Rundblad and Annaz, 2010).
While the above two studies have only investigated metaphors,
further research has targeted a broader range of figurative
expressions. MacKay and Shaw (2004) report performance on six
categories of expressions, including hyperbole, indirect requests,
irony, metonymy, rhetorical questions and understatement. The
assumption in their design is that all of these categories involve
interpreting what is intended, rather than said, in each expression.
For this purpose, the authors used two measures, correct
understanding of the meaning of the expression, and correct
understanding of the intent of the speaker. In this study language
stimuli were accompanied by supporting picture material to
provide visual focus for the participants. The experimental
group included high-functioning ASD children compared to a
control group with no communicative difficulties. In addition
to the statistical analysis of results, the study also includes
many examples of children’s responses illustrating the specific
pattern evident in the autistic spectrum in interpreting figurative
expressions. This study documents a scale of difficulty in the
area of figurative language, with irony standing out as (the most)
challenging task, even for typical children, especially processing
the intent of the speaker, and fewer problems in rhetorical
questions, even for autistic children, where the meaning of
such questions is accessible. Areas where a significant difference
was observed between the typically developing children and the
ASD group, include indirect requests (intent), understatements
(intent), as well as metonymy (both meaning and intent). The
latter category was problematic even in the presence of visual
support cues, and especially when the visual cues were less
suggestive. Based on the finding that ASD children performed at
the same level as the control group on understanding the meaning
of certain figurative expressions (indirect requests, rhetorical
questions, understatement), but failed at understanding the intent
of those same expressions, the authors suggest that this result
may be caused by different levels of language competencies
and skills in the two groups, not evident in the results on the
vocabulary scales (BPVS). Unfortunately, this study cannot be
compared to the above two, since it did not address metaphors
(but only metonymy), and did not ask the same question, namely
the extent to which figurative language interpretation depends
on ToM ability. Yet, it establishes a scale of difficulty in the
processing of indirect language and compares performance by
ASD children to typically developing peers in a range of figurative
expressions.
Whyte et al. (2014) more recently studied idioms in children
with ASD ages 5–12 years. They tested them on idiom
comprehension, advanced ToM, vocabulary, and syntax. Like the
other studies on figurative language, they also found that they
performed worse than children matched on chronological-age.
They were not, however, worse at understanding idioms than a
syntax-matched control group of younger children. These results
would support Norbury (2005) view that language impairment
is actually the strongest factor in predicting performance on
figurative language tasks.
Beyond group studies, a couple of case studies have addressed
figurative language in autism. Melogno et al. (2012a) provide a
case study of two high-functioning ASD children. Participants
were assessed twice, first prior to, and subsequently following
an intervention. Even though, initially the two ASD children
showed performance comparable to the average range of typical
controls, their patterns of response were different. Assessment
after intervention revealed improvement, but in a different way
for each participant. Moreover, the level of performance was still
below their chronological age, indicative of a “drift” in figurative
language comprehension.
In our own work we have addressed the cognitive and language
profiles of two high-functioning (Asperger) children with a talent
for language learning (Vulchanova et al., 2012a,b). These two
case studies tested, among other language competencies, idiom
comprehension and metaphor comprehension. Both participants
in the studies displayed a highly deviant profile in idiom
knowledge compared to similarly-aged controls. In the younger
participant, the gap in performance with chronological age
was huge (z = −3.08). Moreover, the participant performed
poorer even than much younger children on the same task,
suggesting a deviant developmental trajectory. Even though
the gap with chronological age was somewhat smaller for the
older participant (z = −2.22), it was still significant. The
same participant showed an atypical pattern of responses to
metaphorical expressions based on the design by Gold et al.
(2010). In contrast to typical age-matched controls, for this
participant, reaction times to novel metaphors and nonsense
expressions were similar, reflecting a problem in distinguishing
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between these two types of expressions and assessing their
plausibility.
Some studies have failed to find significant differences in
accuracy scores for participants with autism in studies of
figurative language comprehension. For example, Colich et al.
(2012) tested whether children and adolescents with autism
were able to interpret the ironic intent of speakers. Although
both typically developing and autistic participants showed longer
response times to ironic comments, brain activation profile
was more bilateral in the case of the ASD group, indicating a
potential compensation mechanism in processing this kind of
figurative language. The study by Pexman et al. (2011) also found
similar responses in an irony comprehension task, with results
in eye-tracking variables and judgment latencies indicating that
individuals with autism might be using different mechanisms to
respond.
DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE IN ASD
In addition to the role of structural language abilities, a great
deal of research has explored the influence of other variables
that could potentially explain this deficit in the interpretation
of nonliteral meaning in participants with autism. In this
sense, an interesting question is whether these skills develop
in relation to chronological age also in this population, and
further whether there is development in relation to mental
age. This was first studied from a developmental perspective
by Rundblad and Annaz (2010). They compared performance
on metonymy to metaphor performance in ASD and typical
children. While metaphor is considered to represent a mapping
between two distinct conceptual domains, metonymy is a
mapping within the same conceptual domain (Lakoff, 1987),
and, as such, may be considered a less demanding. The
study included picture stories with lexicalized metaphors and
lexicalized metonymies incorporated in brief stories. The authors
established developmental trajectories for each group, and
for each task, first assessing performance on the two tasks
relative to chronological age. While for the typical group
performance on both metonymy and metaphor increased reliably
with chronological age, no reliable correlation was found
between scores and chronological age on either task in the
ASD children. In this group, in addition, children performed
significantly worse on the metaphor task. These two tasks also
revealed two different trajectories. While for metonymy there
was a development, for metaphor, performance was constant
across time and ages, indicating what the authors label a
zero trajectory. Furthermore, this study shows that vocabulary
scores predict reliably metonymy in the ASD group, with
improved performance with higher verbal age, while no similar
relationship was found for metaphor comprehension. Thus,
compared to typical controls, the ASD group displays a similar
rate of development for their level of receptive vocabulary in
the area of metonymy, whereas the difference in metaphor
comprehension is significantly different. This study adds an
important developmental perspective, suggesting that metaphors
are an area of specific difficulty where development is not only
delayed (as with metonymy), but also highly atypical and, most
likely, compromised.
Gold et al. (2010) studied metaphor comprehension in
Asperger syndrome in adolescent and adult participants using
four types of expressions, free (literal) expressions (pearl
necklace), conventional metaphors (sealed lips), novel metaphors
(firm words), and nonsensical expressions (violin tiger). Their
main goal was to establish the accuracy of interpreting such
expressions and the degree of cognitive load involved, as
measured by reaction times and brain activation. The results of
this study showed that compared to typical controls, Asperger
individuals present with problems, as reflected in significantly
longer reaction times compared to typical controls. Furthermore,
different patterns of activation, as seen in the N400 amplitude,
were found between the Asperger participants and the control
group, which reached significance for the category conventional
and novel metaphor. While, in the control group conventional
metaphors elicited least negativity, for the Asperger group, it was
literal expressions. This suggests greater effort in the processing
of metaphor across the board in ASD individuals, including
even conventional metaphors, which can be stored, as well
as novel metaphorical expressions. Moreover, in the Asperger
group reaction times were significantly longer for the processing
of nonsense expressions. The latter result is indicative of a
specific problem evident in other studies of figurative language in
autism, namely the inability to assess the plausibility of linguistic
expressions events or facts (Tager-Flusberg, 1981; Paul et al.,
1988).
An interesting study provides evidence of a specific
dissociation between the processing of visually presented
metaphors and verbally presented ones in autistic populations
(Mashal and Kasirer, 2012). This study compared ASD and
Learning Deficit children to typically developing controls. They
used 11 subtests, ranging from figurative language interpretation
including visual metaphors, idioms, conventional metaphors,
novel metaphors, to homophones and semantic tests (synonymy,
similarity). The authors analysed the data using a Principal
Component Analysis to investigate for clustering of performance
results. Results loaded on three different factors in all three
groups in the study, and while there was a significant overlap
in the loading between groups, both deficit groups displayed a
clustering of all three verbal figurative language skills (idioms,
conventional and novel metaphors) in the same factor, suggestive
of the specific problems in that population. Moreover, in
those two groups there was a dissociation between metaphors
presented visually, and those presented verbally, as reflected
in the results loading on two different factors. In contrast, the
typical children displayed an association between idioms and
conventional metaphors, which can be expected, given the nature
of conventionalized expressions and idioms, and an association
between visual and novel metaphors, which loaded together on
a separate factor. This latter result suggests an integration in
typical individuals of the processing of metaphors, irrespective
of their modality (visual or verbal), most probably through a
common underlying cognitive mechanism. This does not appear
to be the case in the autism group and the group with learning
deficits.
All of the clinical studies reviewed here document a
dissociation between literal and figurative language in autism,
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which argues against a simple continuity model. Clearly a revision
of this model is called for in the face of these data.
ACCOUNTS OF THE PRAGMATIC DEFICIT: A SPECIFIC DEFICIT OR NOT?
From the studies reviewed above and earlier findings, it becomes
evident that there is a pervasive problem in the autistic spectrum
in the broader domain of pragmatic aspects of language. However,
there is a debate concerning the causes of this problem and
what aspects of the autistic profile can account for the pragmatic
deficit. One assumption is that the pragmatic deficit is not
special and does not dissociate from the rest of language
competence in autism. The idea is that performance on pragmatic
tasks and the ability to process (ambiguous) language in
context correlates directly with structural language competence
(Norbury, 2005; Brock et al., 2008; Gernsbacher and Pripas-Kapit,
2012).
Alternatively, the pragmatic deficit can be linked to other
traits in the autistic profile. Thus, one of the most widely
accepted theories of what is causing the deficit in the domain
of figurative language and metaphors, in particular, is based
on Happé’s study and hypothesis that the deficit is caused
by impaired mentalising skills and in terms of impaired ToM
(see also Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Happé, 1993; Baron-Cohen,
2000, 2001). Clearly, the ToM hypothesis can explain one
aspect of what is necessary to be able to perceive others’
intentions, including those expressed verbally. Yet, many studies
reveal increased problems with decrease in the transparency
of the mapping between language structure and (intended)
interpretation (MacKay and Shaw, 2004). All studies document
a specific problem in the area of metaphors, even compared to
closely related, but less demanding, phenomena, such as e.g.,
metonymy. This indicates that reading intentions (mentalising)
needs to be operationalized accordingly on a finer scale of
gradience, explaining difficulties and/or success in all types of
figurative expressions.
A host of hypotheses attempts an account in terms of
more general cognitive mechanisms dedicated to information
processing. Some authors attribute the deficit to more general
problems in executive functioning and the inability to suppress
unnecessary information (Ozonoff et al., 1991; Mashal and
Kasirer, 2012). This account links to the well-observed problem
in assessing event plausibility (Tager-Flusberg, 1981), but also
to the Weak Central Coherence account (Frith, 1989; Frith and
Happé, 1994; Happé and Frith, 2006). Happé and Frith (2006)
suggest that individuals with ASD have difficulties to understand
metaphors, because they have a deficit in executive function
and central coherence. This can be attributed to the fact that
individuals with ASD display a bias for processing information
locally rather than globally. Frith (1989) points out that in
order to be able to understand a word or an expression they
should be put in a concrete context. Context is even more
important for figurative expressions, in order to process the
intended meaning, rather than just the literal one. In fact, weak
central coherence has been attributed as the source of pragmatic
problems in individuals with ASD (Noens and van Berckelaer-
Onnes, 2005). In addition, Norbury and Bishop (2002) found
that people with ASD have difficulties in contextual integration,
and the more ambiguous the expression is, the greater the
problem in this population (Happé, 1997; Jolliffe and Baron-
Cohen, 1999, 2000; López and Leekam, 2003; Brock et al.,
2008).
Other accounts seek to explain the pragmatic deficit at the
neural level in terms of a right hemisphere (RH) deficit (Gold
and Faust, 2010; Gold et al., 2010). In one study, participants
were asked to perform a semantic judgment task. The results
indicated much less Right Hemispheric contribution to novel
metaphor comprehension in ASD. Impaired RH activity was
further documented in other studies of figurative language
processing (Faust and Mashal, 2007).
Alternatively, it can be assumed that the inability to
process figurative language arises from problems in information
integration, especially when information is to be retrieved from
multiple sources (e.g., problems with processing in context), and
linking this to the more general deficit at global processing (top
down) at the expense of enhanced local processing (bottom up).
Of special interest here is that the well-documented problems in
processing ambiguous information arise only in the context of
language contra visual information (López and Leekam, 2003),
and dissociates from structural language skills (Vulchanova et al.,
2012a,b). Furthermore, there is evidence that visual and linguistic
metaphors dissociate only in autistic participants, but not in
typical children (Rundblad and Annaz, 2010). Therefore, it would
be logical to conclude that the difficulties that people with
autism demonstrate in figurative language are probably due
to inability to either access both modalities at the same time
or integrate information from more than one modality at the
same time. While the visual context may assist interpretation in
typical populations, it may create additional problems in deficit
populations such as individuals with autism (Chahboun et al., in
preparation).
Indeed, one of the main symptoms of ASD is the lack
of information integration and absence of adaptability to
the environment (Minshew et al., 1997; Brock et al., 2008).
Many authors attribute this to the inability to gather together
information in order to be able to distinguish between relevant
and irrelevant information, in part attributable to weak central
coherence (Frith, 1989; Happé and Frith, 2006; Vulchanova
et al., 2012b). Selecting relevant features of the metaphor vehicle
concept and suppressing the irrelevant ones has been suggested
as the basic mechanism in metaphor comprehension (Rubio
Fernandez, 2007).
It is widely argued that individuals with ASD are impaired in
processing ambiguous linguistic information in context (López
and Leekam, 2003; Brock et al., 2008). In addition, they often fail
to attach context to their memories and are specifically impaired
in processing social aspects of contextual information (Greimel
et al., 2012).
Happé (1996) suggests that difficulties in global processing
could be due to conceptual semantic deficits, but also to a
failure in extracting perceptual properties from context. López
and Leekam (2003) provide evidence that the ability to use
context is spared in the visual domain, but reduced in the
verbal one. Further, they document increased problems with
increased complexity of the verbal stimuli and with higher level
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of ambiguity. This points to the limitations in the ability to
use contextual information in individuals with ASD, but not a
complete absence of this skill.
The extent to which individuals with autism can use context
in disambiguation is an open question, and findings are
controversial. Some authors consider that people with ASD are
unable to use contextual information in sentence-processing
tasks. Others still, claim that success or failure depend on the
nature of the context: the more general the information provided
by the context is, the more difficult it is for autistic participants to
disambiguate homographs (Hermelin and O’Connor, 1967; Frith
and Snowling, 1983; López and Leekam, 2003).
Saldaña and Frith (2007) and Tirado (2013) document that
children with ASD have a normal reduction in reading times for
expressions which are congruent with previous events, suggesting
a relative strength at detecting congruence. It has also been argued
that the ability to use context depends on structural language
skills, and only ASD participants with poor language skills fail to
use visual context (Norbury, 2005; Brock et al., 2008). What is
clear from these studies is that different types of context present
different processing demands, and autistic performance varies
accordingly.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Language is a complex multi-layered and multifaceted system. In
order to interpret language appropriately, users need a number
of skills. Figurative language can be even more demanding
in terms of processing. It is acquired relatively late and has
a complex nature, which makes it even more difficult for
atypical population, such as individuals with ASD, to understand.
What skills are deemed necessary for language processing and
figurative language, in particular? Adequate structural language
competence, adequate semantic competencies and skills and
vocabulary size (Norbury, 2004, 2005; Oakhill and Cain, 2012),
inferencing skills; a developed conceptual system and a knowledge
base (Schneider et al., 1989; Fuchs et al., 2012; Oakhill and
Cain, 2012); information integration skills (context; evaluating
plausibility and suppressing irrelevant information, Rubio
Fernandez, 2007); mentalising and understanding intentions (see
Kintsch, 2000 for a computer simulation model). Needless to
say, many of these skills co-vary with language (e.g., semantic
skills and vocabulary, conceptual knowledge, and the knowledge
base are often directly associated with linguistic labels), so
studying them in isolation and controlling for their impact on
figurative language depends on the kind of measure adopted.
Impairment in any one of these areas is sufficient to cause
problems in the comprehension of figurative language. For
instance, in order to understand one of the most demanding
instances of figurative language, metaphor, the user not only
needs to have prior experience and knowledge of the concepts
that are being associated in a metaphorical expression, but
also knowledge of their respective domains and the networks
they form with other concepts in these domains (Keil, 1986;
Bambini et al., 2011). This requires information integration
and processing skills, beyond those required for simple concept
combination (Barsalou, 1999; Wu and Barsalou, 2009), and
depends on the ability to form associations, analogies and
other top-down skills. If we take high-functioning autistic
individuals as a test case, the cause of the persistent difficulty
in figurative language becomes more evident. In this population,
structural language is intact; they present with adequate semantic
and conceptual skills, are good at compositional operations
at the level of the sentence, perform adequately at a number
of inferencing tasks (Tirado, 2013 PhD thesis), and usually
pass first-order, and often second-order ToM tasks, and have
an age-appropriate knowledge base, as attested by normal IQ
scores. The only area where problems persist is information
integration and inability to use information from the database
adequately: evaluating plausible/implausible events; assessing
what is relevant; combining information arising from different
modalities.
Building on the original proposal by Kintsch (1998), an
influential account of (reading) comprehension suggests that
success at language processing depends on creating appropriate
situation models. This means that the language user needs to
create a mental representation of what the message is about, not
what the message says (Zwaan, 1999). Based on the evidence
in research on problems in the domain of figurative language
interpretation, it is highly likely that autistic individuals have
problems in building and making use of appropriate situation
models. The models they build could in some respects be
incomplete. More importantly, they might not be able to make
use of them to understand the co-locutor’s intention with the
message. It seems as though, they possess the necessary knowledge
base, but cannot use it adequately, since they cannot judge
plausibility (Tager-Flusberg, 1981; Paul et al., 1988), often fail at
certain types of inferences, and are not always good at exploiting
contextual information. It has been shown that typical children
benefit from visual support and are better at processing visually
presented metaphors (Epstein and Gamlin, 1994). However,
multi-modal and multi-sensory information appears to be a
problem in autism, despite intact visual processing per se (López
and Leekam, 2003; Chahboun et al., in preparation). As a
consequence, individuals in the autistic spectrum fail to integrate
a situation model that integrates the necessary information, the
speaker’s intent and the rest of the context in which all this must
be used.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Most of the studies reviewed in this paper are heterogeneous and
difficult to compare. They have used different methodologies,
test skills in different figurative language domains, and often
use largely heterogeneous groups of participants. Thus, quite
often the range of participants is from mid-childhood to
adulthood. Since one of the intriguing questions in research in
developmental deficits is whether one can expect development in
the comprehension of the different types of figurative expressions,
more homogenous groups are required, in both longitudinal and
cross-sectional studies (cf. Melogno et al., 2012b for a similar
point). Similarly, the types of expressions selected in those studies
vary tremendously, especially those that have been chosen as
exponents of the target category. For instance, the degree to
which expressions fall in the category of conventional metaphor
needs to be tested prior to including it in an experiment.
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Likewise, other linguistic properties of the stimuli are important:
frequency of expression and/or constituent words will affect
processing; collocational frequency of the constituents in the
expression (e.g., “buckle” and “button” are by far the most
frequent complement fillers of “fasten”, as in fasten a buckle/a
belt, so these phrases tells us little about argument structure
competence in typical and deficit populations alike).
The observed dissociation between figurative (non-literal) and
literal language processing in ASD lends support to findings
about the neural correlates of idiomatic language processing
in typical adult populations (Lauro et al., 2008), suggesting a
bilateral involvement of fronto-temporal areas for idioms against
selective activation of left inferior parietal areas in the case
of literal expressions. The recruitment of the prefrontal cortex
may reflect an active selection between alternative meanings
when idioms are processed. This offers a new perspective for
future research comparing the neural and cognitive mechanisms
involved in figurative language comprehension in autism and
typical populations.
Another intriguing line of research are recent accounts of
the role of embodiment in human cognition and, specifically, in
language comprehension (Barsalou, 2008). It has been suggested
that the well-attested communication problems in autism could
be partially driven by core (low-level) cognitive mechanisms,
such as deficits in temporal coordination and sensori-motor
impairment (e.g., motor movement). This type of account
is consistent with models of embodied cognition in typical
populations and is worth pursuing in future research (Eigsti,
2013).
An interesting, yet unexplored perspective are parallel studies
of similar pragmatic deficits observed in different developmental
disorders. For instance, Lacroix et al. (2010) document problems
in idiom comprehension in French speaking children and
adolescents with William’s syndrome. Similar results have been
found while testing the ability to understand metaphors and
sarcasm (Karmiloff-Smith et al., 1995; Annaz et al., 2009). Since
WS is characterized by a relative strength in language and social
interest, but poor conversational skills, contra impaired spatial
cognition, it would be interesting to test how this population
compares to the autistic spectrum, especially the higher end,
where structural language is spared, too. Even more intriguingly, it
has been suggested that the observed figurative language problems
in WS may be attributed to poor semantic integration (Hsu,
2013).
Finally, if we are right in attributing the figurative language
deficit to poor information integration and impaired situation
models, appropriate tasks need to be set up to test for exactly these
types of skills. Developmental deficits offer a rare glimpse into
the, sometimes subtle, dissociations between and within cognitive
domains, such as e.g., structural vs. extended (figurative)
language, and as such, can shed light on how metaphors and other
figurative expressions are processed in typical individuals, what
kinds of demands this processing requires and at what cost. Future
research should seek to provide a consistent comprehensive
account of the mechanisms involved in language comprehension
at the neural and cognitive levels in both typical and deficit
populations (Dilkina and Lambon Ralph, 2013).
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